If memory serves, the first place I ran across the argument presented in the George Packer article highlighted by BP, about how the war on terror should really be conceptualized as a global counterinsurgency campaign, was a couple of years ago in Michael Scheuer’s excellent Imperial Hubris. In general terms, I certainly agree with BP that it’s a far better way to think about our vendetta against al-Qaeda et al than the Bush Administration’s initial response, which was to try to smash or cow all states that might aid terror networks.
There was a catch, however. Scheuer argued, very persuasively I thought, that we are not under attack because of the values we represent, but rather for the specific policies we have followed. In a very dark conclusion, he warned that unless the U.S. fundamentally alters its policies towards the Middle East, we are in for a long and bloody war of attrition. I won’t go into specifics here about what changes he advocated, but you could probably guess at them. The point is that our image in the Muslim world stems directly from the policies we follow. No cosmetic tinkering, not the best propaganda from even our most skillful spinmeisters can mitigate the consequences of policies that alienate an enormous chunk of the world’s population. If, as in the case of the invasion of Iraq, our own policies become more radical, then we are digging ourselves an even deeper hole.
In a recent study, published by NYU’s Center for Law and Security, terrorism analysts Peter Bergen and Paul Cruikshank attempt to calculate what effect the Iraq War has had on global terror. The results are sobering. Even discounting for Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a sharp rise in terrorist attacks from the period between 9/11 and the Iraq invasion to the period between the invasion and late 2006. There has also been a rise in fatalities, and an increased rate of attack on U.S. and Western allied targets. The situation will likely worsen when foreign fighters begin to slink out of Iraq, bringing their newfound skills home with them.
As BP put it quite rightly, the only metric that counts in a counterinsurgency campaign is convincing the local population that its security depends on cooperating with your forces. There was a time in Iraq when a smart counterinsurgency campaign might have turned the tide. That time, it now seems likely, was late 2003, and by early 2004 the future had practically written itself. In the face of insurgent intimidation, the Iraqi population found it could not count on American forces to protect it, and began the fateful turn instead to sectarian affiliations. The vilest of the insurgent groups, of course, are willing to turn Iraq into a charnel house to force the U.S. to leave. They will do this to the entire region if they can.
Any troop surge at this moment in time is nothing more than sticking one’s fist into a bowl of water; the water will be displaced, but it will come rushing back in when the fist is removed. The most important thing the U.S. can do now is quite obvious but incredibly difficult. It must act without delay to ensure that when the Iraqi civil war does break out, it does not drag Iraq’s neighbors into the maelstrom. It is also incumbent on the U.S. to work with all Middle Eastern governments in formulating effective countermeasures against the many terrorists operating in Iraq who will one day seek to return home or emigrate to the West. We cannot afford to be caught unprepared.
2 comments:
Our policies will always offend some. I would say that we should first pursue our own interests. Other people's opinions are secondary and are always manipulated - if not by us, then by others.
For example, the statement "not the best propaganda...can mitigate the consequences of policies that alienate an enormous chunk of the world’s population" hides several pieces of propaganda:
1) Muslims can be usefully thought of as a unit.
2) Muslims all have the same reactions to contemporary events.
3) Events have only one factual interpretation, therefore the way they are presented is irrelevant.
4) Muslims are capable of perceiving the factual interpretation of reality.
Points (1) and (2) are unrealistic; Muslims do not have a hive mind any more than Christians do, and have at least equal diversity of opinion. Religion determines neither political views nor one's response to world events. To be sure, religion can be politicized, but the politicization is both distinct from the religion itself and contingent upon specific local conditions.
Points (3) and (4) are also problematic. A report on current events that neglects history, culture, or strategic pressures might be very misleading. The situation in Aden in the 1960s is a good example. "Revolutionary" Cairo, the USSR, and China all broadcast a tale of brave tribesmen rising against British imperialists. However, Whitehall had already agreed to withdraw and were attempting to effect a peaceful, stable transition of power. The Communists were not fond of the idea and liberally donated arms, training, and propaganda to discontented Yemeni tribesmen. Their campaign of assassination and terror continued well beyond the departure of the last British soldier. Having eventually seized power, the Communist government and its foreign sponsors then tried to export their revolution to neighboring Oman.
The Communist news sources reported factual information. The Yemeni tribesmen were poor and marginalized. There were British imperialists in Aden. But they also left things out: things like murdering anti-Communist civilians, or things like the selfish (and arguably imperialist) reasons for Chinese and Soviet support.
Facts matter, but they can be contextualized in different ways. Inattention to propaganda has allowed our enemies to seize the high ground in the information war.
It is worth nothing that the four points implicit in the sentence quoted above are mainstays of jihadi propaganda. In a way, the argument in favor of Scheuer's view that facts matter more than perceptions undermines itself by using one side's propaganda to sell itself.
I do like the idea of working to minimize the effects of Iraq's collapse and of dealing aggressively with Iraq-trained European Muslims. I also agree that certain policies are more likely than others to provoke. Other people's reactions should be a factor in decision-making - but they should not be weighted as heavily as, for example, security.
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