The Anthropology of Insurgencies

I discovered in an old New Yorker a fascinating essay by George Packer concerning the ways social scientists working with the US government have attempted to redefine the war on terror as a global counterinsurgency. "Terrorists" cannot be persuaded, can operate in isolation, and can only be dealt with coercively. Because the US government has defined the conflict as a "war on terror" its strategies have emphasized military action. But an insurgent, as Packer writes, "has a mass base whose support can be won or lost through politics." This means that "political, economic, and informational operations" are just as important as organized violence.

This seems to be a superior way of framing world events. To argue, as the Bush administration has, that Iraq, Iran, Aceh, Chechnya, Palestine, the bidonvilles of Rabat and Paris, and the suburbs of Manchester and Hamburg are all part of the same "war" is to distort reality. In fact, such an argument is in the interest of Al Qa'ida and its colleagues. The propaganda strategy of jihadists like bin Laden consists of trying to persuade "we Muslims" (all lumped together in an imagined unity) that "we" are under attack from "them" (that is, the "Jews and Crusaders") all over the world. Fortunately, such a view is demonstrably false. Different conflicts have different histories, different dynamics, and different solutions. This is why the sorts of things that interest anthropologists - like subjective motivations, the structures of and rivalries within groups and network, or the roles of tribal and kinship ties - also ought to interest policymakers. Anthropological details can be used to detect and exploit opportunities.

Packer also argues that "winning hearts and minds is not a matter of making local people like you—as some American initiates to counterinsurgency whom I met in Iraq seemed to believe—but of getting them to accept that supporting your side is in their interest, which requires an element of coercion." Whether you are feared or loved is irrelevant. Incentives matter more. Building a school in Kandahar may win the US Army friends during the daylight hours, but what are locals to think when the Taliban shows up at night and says "Support us or we'll kill you"? The subjective cost to a local population of working with your opponents must be less than that of working with you.

Meanwhile, for those beyond the Taliban's reach, propaganda and the information war become paramount. As Packer writes, insurgents in Iraq do not destroy a Humvee to reduce the number of Humvees in Iraq by one. On the contrary, they destroy it so that they can acquire spectacular footage of a burning Humvee, post it on the Internet, and solicit support for their cause. The objective is to generate influence. Insurgents do not expect to win by destroying the enemy but rather by destroying his will to fight. Thus, Packer's sources refer to the Taliban's activity as "armed propaganda operations...[alternating] guerrilla activity and terrorist activity as they need to, in order to maintain the political momentum, and it’s all about an information operation that generates the perception of an unstoppable, growing insurgency."

Perception is key. The Algerian insurgents never defeated the French army; by 1962, the reverse was true. But they were able to create the perception that the French were immoral and losing. Once that impression was fixed in the global imagination the outcome was not in doubt.

Packer's article emphasizes the power of ideas. If we disagree with Tawhid wa Jihad's ideas, we should promote persuasive alternatives. For example, we could co-opt, create, or sponsor groups with counter-messages. Moreover, a thorough understanding of how such groups recruit and operate could help us subvert them from within.

New media such as satellite television and the Internet have revolutionized communication. Propaganda is more accessible and powerful than at any time in the past. Consequently, founding schools or subsidizing educational exchanges can be far more effective than dropping bombs.

Similarly, with mass persuasion in mind, it is counter-productive to regard one's current opponents as evil. How are you going to have a productive conversation with someone you regard as a "totalitarian" or "Islamofascist" or "infidel"? It is impossible to persuade someone if you are incapable of understanding and sympathizing with his perspective. If persuasion is central to victory, a lack of empathy could spell defeat.